I.
In June 1557 31 deputies, who represented 140 of the more than 300 estates of the Holy Roman Empire, met in Speyer to discuss monetary policies. The topic was the currency bill Charles V had published six years before, the issue at hand the fact that most estates had so far failed to fully implement this law. 1 The Imperial Diet had met in the city of Regensburg during the winter 1556 to 1557 to discuss the problem. There, the estates had suggested making use of an audit of the Imperial Chamber Court in Speyer planned for the coming summer to convene a currency conference at the same place. Any estate holding grievances or complaints against Charles V's bill should make their views known; the deputies would discuss them and would submit the results of their deliberations to the next Imperial Diet who would make a final decision.
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At the currency conference, King Ferdinand -Charles V's brother and designated successorwas represented by two commissioners. The report they sent to their principal emphasised the constructive atmosphere in Speyer. They praised 'with what even-mindedness even those estates' had joined the talks, 'who at the recent Imperial Diet had sharply and with bitterness cried out about the bill and law and had emphasised the serious complaints they held against it'. 3 Even so, more than enough bitterness was in evidence. The deputies of the electors of Saxony, Cologne and the Palatinate flatly denied that their masters had ever agreed to Charles V's currency bill, and the chancellor of the elector of Mainz stated that the publication of the law had never been authorised; it remained to be seen who had sent it to the printer 'but the 2 chancellery of Mainz was inculpable in this'. According to the report the delegates of the Saxon elector sent home, this was the cue for almost all other deputies: they had not realised that the bill had not been passed unanimously; if they had known, their masters would not have agreed to it, nor would they have started to issue coins in accordance with its regulations 'and all confessed and stated that it would have been much better if this currency law and ordinance had never existed'. 4 What had happened? This was no squabble about details of economic policies that had little practical relevance; rather, what was at issue was one of the central fields of politics pursued at the level of the Empire. There was no other economic problem that occupied emperors and
Empire as permanently as that of how to create a common currency. Since the 14 th century, emperors had tried to make their influence felt in this field, 5 and since Sigismund of Luxembourg's time the issue was regularly discussed at Imperial assemblies. 6 At his election in 1519, Charles V had promised to remedy the deficiencies from which the money used in the Empire's suffered, 7 and the Imperial Governing Council (Reichsregiment) had in 1524 published a currency ordinance that aimed at achieving this. 8 However, it had done this in the emperor's absence and without consulting the Imperial Diet. Neither Charles V nor the majority of the estates recognised the ordinance, far less enforced it. Now, in the 1550s, the situation had changed. When the chancellor of the elector of Mainz claimed that no-one had ever authorised the publication of the Imperial currency bill, he was not entirely correct. The Augsburg Diet of 1550-51 had discussed the bill and asked the emperor to make it public. He was to do this immediately after a comprehensive so-called The core of this article is formed by two structural sections (IV. and V.). They introduce the parties dominating the discussions about monetary reform in the decade between 1549 and 1559, focusing on their aims and their underlying political and fiscal motives. These sections are framed by two others that discuss historical events: Section III explains how the process of reform gained momentum in the second half of the 1540s and how decision making was organised, while section VI follows the further development of monetary policies until the passage of the currency bill of 1559. First, however, the state of current research and the sources on which the present article is based are described (section II). A conclusion (section VII) summarises the main findings. 
II.
Much of the literature on the history of the creation of a common Imperial currency in the sixteenth century stands in the shadow of Friedrich Freiherr von Schrötter's work. 12 About a century ago, Schrötter was the first to advance the core hypothesis that has since dominated research. 13 According to him, the Empire's monetary policy was shaped by the clash of interests between those estates who controlled their own silver mines and those who did not.
Fritz Blaich adopted this view, and large sections of the more recent literature followed him. 14 It is this clash that is generally regarded as the main cause of the perceived failure of the Empire's currency laws -i.e. not only of the ordinance of 1524 but of the bills in the 1550s, too.
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Concerning the bill of 1551, research stresses an additional factor: the rate it set for the taler.
The estates who issued this widely popular coin -most importantly the Saxon Elector 
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The present article uses these sources to examine the extent to which they bear out the widely accepted hypothesis that the failure of Charles V's attempt to create a common currency in 1551 was due to the electoral-Saxon resistance against the undervaluation of the taler or to the emperor's inability so enforce his will vis-à-vis intransigent estates. The new sources allow demonstrating that neither of these problems were decisive, and that the most relevant issue was the creation of a bimetallic system. The analysis approaches the problem of bimetallism from a direction that differs from the one taken by much of modern research.
There, the usual aim is to determine why and when bimetallic currencies were able to function despite changes in the relative market prices of gold and silver. Most studies refer to modern conditions; Britain's adoption of the Gold Standard since the 18 th century and 
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Charles intended to strike while the iron was hot. Next to his plan of reforming the Empire's constitution and breaking the Protestant-Catholic deadlock, the common currency project was at the top of his agenda.
The Augsburg Diet of 1547-48 focused on the first and second issues. As for the third, all present agreed that the money used in the Empire was in urgent need of reform. However, they also agreed that a Diet was not a suitable forum to solve the problems this involved. As the councillors of Charles V put it a little later, experience had shown that it was impossible to reach a currency agreement within a Diet. The emperor, electors and other princes might be present but currency experts were normally not; moreover, there was usually so much else to discuss that no time was left for currency issues. 22 In Augsburg, the emperor therefore suggested convening a separate currency conference; electors and princes proposed Speyer as the venue and2 February 1549 as the start date. 23 The Diet gave this conference the most comprehensive mandate imaginable. The estates should send fully authorised expert councillors who should then not only draft a bill for a currency valid in the whole Empire, but should also independently pass this bill. It was to be binding without any further involvement of a Diet. 24 The councillors met as planned in February 1549. However, the conference was soon deferred to September, and it was this second meeting of the year 1549 that proved decisive.
Organisationally, the coinage conference of autumn 1549 copied an Imperial Diet, albeit at a smaller scale. Also, only one estate -Count Ladislas of Haag -was personally present. There is no direct primary evidence for why this issue disappeared. At least in part, a report of the currency committee at the Diet of Worms in 1545 seems to have been responsible. The committee had stated that any dispute about the mint price of silver was futile given that mints used silver coins to purchase raw silver. The quantity of silver bought with each coin was larger the quantity contained in the coin, but the value of this difference could not exceed what was needed to cover the rest of the production costs. The argument was valid. While nominal mint prices might diverge widely across markets, differences between prices expressed in bullion moved between narrow bounds. When the issue of the mint price re-surfaced briefly in summer 1557, the deputies of Trier quoted the currency committee report of 1545, which might be of use particularly to those inexperienced in monetary matters: 'It would truly help to disclose this to all deputies at this conference'. loans taken up by the duke. 15 of these were denominated in gold guldens; they made up more than a quarter of the total sum. 52 The structure of Flersheim's own debts is shown in a 'summary of all the bishopric of Speyer's revenues' that the treasurer compiled in 1541 and which condenses the fiscal situation of the preceding decade: 53 While only 3.5 per cent of the debts that Flersheim inherited from his predecessor in 1529 were denominated in gold, almost two-thirds of those he incurred himself until the early 1540s were in gold and had to be serviced with gold.
The difference between these values prohibits generalisations. What is obvious, though, is that a bimetallic currency favoured debtors as long as they were able on the one hand to purchase the coins they needed to service their obligations at exchange rates close to the market price of gold or silver, and on the other hand to compel their creditors to accept these coins at their legal value. Daily experience taught that official exchange rates were impossible to enforce on the markets of the Empire. 54 At the same time, princes would very likely be able to force their creditors to respect Imperial law, including a law that determined the official ratio of gold and silver coins. Indebted princes would thus have the chance to choose that metal whose market price was lower than its official value determined in 1549 to service their gold-denominated debts. It is no surprise that the princely councillors were 52 24 further loans of Duke Ernest were denominated in florins, that is, probably in the locally common unit of account 'St Mary's florin' (à 20 silver St Mary's groschen). 2 were denominated in 'mark', i.e. in the Mark Lübisch current in Lüneburg. Assuming that the value of the St Mary's florin was roughly the same as that of the Austrian silver florin, i.e. about 0.9 rhinegulden, and that rhinegulden rate was about 1. delighted with Flersheim's proposal, and it will not surprise either that the envoys of the Free and Imperial Cities -many of which were creditors of princes -opposed it.
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V.
The Cities did not stand alone. The electors on the Rhine, too, resolutely refused to accept the bimetallic system the Imperial commissioners put forward. 56 In November 1549 the electors themselves turned directly to the emperor in order to convince him of their counterarguments. 57 Their memorandum listed three reasons why they opposed a bimetallic system. First, they pointed out that conventions and contracts were based, among other things, on natural law and on the law of nations. Anything the contracting parties had agreed therefore had to be observed. 58 The Electors did not only refer to the general legal tenet of pacta sunt servanda but to an argument made by the realist school of Scholasticism. This claimed that while debtors might repay their debts with other coins than those they had originally borrowed, these coins had to be of the same type or exactly the same value.
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Forcing creditors to accept silver in lieu of gold without a hearing and against their will therefore meant violating their rights. Debtors who allowed this were not only damaging their reputation but had to expect resistance and even feuds and rioting. FN 1 of silver. In other words, gold would be undervalued and therefore exported to neighbouring countries where its value was higher. 61 The argument was sound. While in many places the value of the rhinegulden was already 72 kreuzers, these were kreuzers struck according to the Austrian standard of 1535. The rate implied a gold-silver ratio of 1:11.84. If the rhinegulden was equated with 72 kreuzers of the new standard planned in Speyer, the ratio dropped to 1:10.64 (cf. Figure 1) . 62 At the same time, the ratio at the Paris mint was 1:11.65.
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Accordingly, the value of gold in the Empire would have been about 9 per cent lower than in Paris. The difference would probably have been sufficient to cover the costs of exporting the metal and reminting it abroad. As the electors pointed out, the result would be that 'the common weal would be weakened and the property and income of both the high-and lowranking members of this nation destroyed, which would cast the German nation in comparison with its neighbours into eternal poverty' -a conclusion that seemed obvious if one equated a country's stock of bullion with its wealth.
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Finally, the electors stressed the vagaries of mining which could cause sudden changes in the value of silver and made any attempt to establish a stable ratio to gold futile. Therefore, introducing cumbersome monetary innovations was pointless. What was even more important was that any currency law including such innovations would soon be outdated. 65 The electors here anticipated an argument that long dominated thinking on bimetallic currencies. Changes in supply and demand and in the relative prices of gold and silver were seen as the Achilles heel of such systems. Older research assumed that consumers would exploit the legally 61
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As the share of pure silver was lower in small change than in larger coins, gold silver ratios also depended on which silver units were exchanged for the rhinegulden. 
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determined ratio of gold and silver coins: They would react to a rise in the market price in one of the metals by culling coins minted from this metal, melting them and selling them as raw material. More recent studies have demonstrated that bimetallic currencies may still be stable. Only when the difference between the legal and the market ratios of the two metals is large enough to cover both the costs of melting those coins whose intrinsic value is rising, and of selling the metal, does the effort to cull these pieces pay. 66 However, even then a shift in the relative prices of gold and silver did not necessarily cause one of the metals to disappear from circulation. If the local authority proves incapable of forcing consumers to use money at its legal face value, those coins whose intrinsic value rises are not withdrawn from circulation but traded at a premium. 67 This possibility is something the delegates of the Rhenish Electors pointed out quite early in the talks.
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Charles V's councillors drafted a counter memorandum where they addressed the Electors'
arguments point by point. They emphasised that a legal fiction allowed the assumption that coins used for repaying debts had the same value as those originally lent, in particular as the value of money was a function of its use rather than of its material (this was the nominalist position in the Scholastic debate about usury); 69 they insisted that the official gold-silver ratio had been determined correctly and stressed that if this should change in future, the Emperor and the estates would be able to adjust the currency law. 70 What Charles' councillors did not mention was how inconsistent the position of the electors was. In March 1549, it had been their delegates who first suggested introducing a silver 72-kreuzers piece that was to be the equivalent of the rhinegulden -a policy that contradicted their later claim that the gulden would be undervalued at that rate. 72 In fact, the proceedings at the electoral custom collection points seem to have been notorious. An expert report on monetary policies reveals the views of the proponents of a fixed ratio between gold and silver coins, claiming that 'when a boatman arrives at a custom post and complains about his lack of gold, and does not know where to obtain any, the customs officer knows how to advise him where to find it, and it may very well be that he, the officer, is involved in this trade and has gold himself'. 73 Whether this kind of peculation did indeed occur or how common it was may be left open. In any case the requirement to pay gold is likely to have contributed to the relative abundance of gold in the Rhineland that Cologne's low gold silver ratio reflects (see Figure 1 ). Once the ratio between the golden florin and the silver 72-kreuzers piece was determined by law, however, merchants liable to pay custom duties had the chance to choose the metal whose market price was currently below its 1549 value. For obvious reasons, the electors disliked this prospect.
In Speyer, the electoral councillors themselves did not mention the custom posts on the Rhine. Had they done this they would have exposed themselves to accusations of selfishness.
The threat of gold being exported from the Empire was a perfectly plausible and far more appropriate argument, which they used early in the talks. 74 The delegates of the princes, 
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VI.
In autumn 1549, the commissioners tried for several weeks to convince the electoral delegates of their point of view. Flersheim used his own situation as an example: He had to purchase the gold he owed with great hardship and at unbearable costs from merchants, and it was 'insufferable that it should not be allowed to use silver instead'. 77 The delegates remained unmoved. When Flersheim became irritated and referred to the Schmalkaldic war ('it had been found how dangerous it was to diminish his Majesty's reputation and dignity, as could easily be seen in the past war when his Majesty did not move against Saxony and
Hesse for reasons of religion, but because of their disobedience'), 78 this was to no avail either. The councillors of the electors did not seriously expect Charles V to go to war over the exchange rate of the rhinegulden. They got nervous, though, when it transpired in October that Solms had travelled to the emperor's court in Brussels to request an Imperial resolution:
They were not aware that anyone had asked Solms to go to Brussels; and they themselves had never desired the emperor's decision. 79 The delegates of the electors were right to worry. This was the main problem. One core result of the present study is that it was the position of the Rhenish electors that made it impossible to effectively implement the currency bill of 1551, and that this position was a function of their interest in their custom dues. These dues were a source of much of their revenues and were defined in terms of gold. As the value of gold increased relative to that of silver, the electors opposed a legally determined ratio between coins made of both metals as much as the obligation to accept silver in custom payments according to this ratio. Such a bimetallic system would have allowed merchants to exploit a further rise in the market value of gold -or a fall in that of silver -to pay their dues in silver coins according to their value as defined in the currency bill. The electoral revenues would have suffered accordingly.
If Charles V's common currency had failed only because the electors on the Rhine opposed it, the hypothesis that the emperor was too weak would sufficiently explain this outcome.
However, the argument misses the point. After all, Ferdinand I succeeded in generating near universal consent for a common currency -and he succeeded at a time when his political position was far less dominant than that of his brother after the Schmalkaldic war. Despite the last estate to adopt the Imperial currency doing so only after Ferdinand's death, it is evident that an emperor able to skilfully to balance the interests of the estates had considerable scope He was in a situation where he could make no right decision.
